College of William & Mary Law School

William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Popular Media

1985

Fighting for the Fourth "R"
Neal Devins
William & Mary Law School, nedevi@wm.edu

Repository Citation
Devins, Neal, "Fighting for the Fourth "R"" (1985). Popular Media. 5.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/popular_media/5

Copyright c 1985 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/popular_media

Faculty and Deans

Fighting for the fourth "R"

"Courts" said
'
one decision,
"are not equipped
to act as
school boards."

based practices. The Establisment
Clause, in part, bars the state from
fostering an excessive government
entanglement with religion. The
Fourteenth Amendment, through its
extension of due process requirements to the states, protects
the rights of parents to direct the upbringing of their children.
Th€ test normally applied in determining whether regulation of religiously motivated conduct violates
the free exercise clause requires a
three-part determination:
(1) whether the challenge is
motivated by, and rooted in, a
legitimately and sincerely held
rei igious belief;
(2) whether and to what extent
state regulations burden free
exercise rights; and
(3) whether any such burden
is justified by a sufficiently
compelling state interest. Bangor Baptist Church v. State, 549
F. Supp. 1208, 1217 (D.Me.
1982) (Summary Judgment
refused).
Government regulation which
significantly burdens the free exercise of religion cannot withstand
constitutional challenge unless it
represents "the least restrictive
means to achieve some compelling
state interest." Thomas v. Review
Board, 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981 ). But
the exemption of a religious activity
from regulation is not constitutionally required where it would "unduly
interfere with fulfillment of the
(compelling) government interest."
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252

(1982).
On this issue, Christian educators
claim that 3 constitutionally unjustifiable stranglehold is being placed
on their rei igious I iberty by state
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laws and bureaucracies. Christian
educators believe that private rei igious schools are mandated by God.
This belief on the part of Christian
educators, that education is inherently religious, demands noncompliance
with state licensing procedures
which grant broad authority to state
boards of education to promulgate
"equivalent educational standards"
for nonpubl ic schools. Most Christian
educators acknowledge, however,
that some limited state regulation is
appropriate to ensure that students
learn basic subject areas in a healthy
environment. See generally Carper,
"The Christian Day School Movement," 47 Educational Forum 135
(Winter 1983)
State officials contend that they
have broad authority to promulgate
"reasonable" educational standards
in private schools. Noting Supreme
Court decisions that held "education
[to be] the most important function
of the state and local governments,"
states frequently claim that expansive regulations are the least intrusive means available to satisfy their
compelling interest in the education
of the young. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
State legislators have enacted, to
varying degrees, regulations which
require private sectarian schools to
satisfy minimum standards in the
following areas: (1) fire, health, and
safety; (2) curriculm; (3) textbook selection; (4) instructional time; (5)
teacher certification; (6) zoning;
(7) consumer protection; (8) student
reporting; (9) testing; (10) state licensing; (11) community interaction,
and (12) guidance services. The most
controversial of these regulations
are programmatic ones which govern
actual teaching practices in nonpublic schools, including curriculum,
textbook. and teacher certification
In addit1on to raising issues under
the free exercise clause, state regulations frequently conflict with the
Establishment Clause prohibition of
excessive governmental entanglement with religion. If Christian educators can demonstrate expansive
government involvement in the daily
operations of their schools, the state
must prove that its regulatory
scheme meets the least restrictive
means-compelling interest test. In
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denying the state's summary judment
motion in Bangor Baptist Church v.
State, the Maine U.S. District Court
discussed the importance of the excessive entanglement concept in Establishment Clause litigation:
An unconstitutional entanglement generally involves the
government's continuing monitoring or potential for regulating the religious activity under
scrutiny.
. In determining whether
there is entanglement, the question is "whether particular acts
in question are intended to establish or interfere with rei igious beliefs of practices or have
the effect of doing so." 549 F.
Supp. at 1221 (citations omitted).
The excessive entanglement prong
of the Establishment Clause test is
often viewed as a list of prohibited
entanglements-that government
may not:
(1) involve itself in "continuing
day-to-day relationships" with such
pervasively religious schools;
(2) have relationships with churchschools which involve an "element
of governmental evaluation and standards;"
(3) carry out legislation or regulations which create situations readily
leading to "confrontations and conflicts" between government and
churches;
(4) have "programs whose very
nature is apt to entangle the state in
details of administration;"
(5) have a "sustained and detailed
relationship [with church institutions]
for enforcement of statutory and adminstrative standards;"
(6) employ, in respect to relation·
ships between teachers and children
in church-schools, "comprehensive
methods of surveillance and control;"
(7) engage in inspection of church
institutional records;
(8) carry out legislation or regulations which create situation requiring
"negotiations" between church institutions which have even the "potential" for the foregoing entanglements.
W. Ball, Memorandum to Our Fundamentalist Christian Friends and
Other Friends of Religious Liberty,
App. 14, 1981, at 3-4.

HEALTHY IDEAS: IRR RESOLUTION PASSED
The ABA House of Delegates, acting on the recommendation of the
Section of Individual Rights and
Responsibilities, has approved a
resolution on "the importation of
ideas and information" into the
United States. Approval of the resolution at the 1985 Midyear Meeting followed submission of a larger
I RR Section recommendation concerning U.S. policy on information
and the issuance of visas to visiting
scholars and political activists.
The delegates approved a resolution stating that "the American
Bar Association recommends that
U.S. pol icy concerning the importation of ideas and information be
guided by the following principle:
"There should be no prohibition
on the import into the United States
of ideas and information if the circulation of the ideas and information in the United States is protected by the First Amendment to
the Constitution. However, this
principle would not preclude (a)
labeling requirements as to the
source of information; (b) restrictions on quantities of material that

Prior court decisions on the state
regulation issue suggest that the outcome of lawsuits involving state regulation of Christian schools often
hinge on whether the courts prefer
unrestrained parental choice in education or state control over some of
the essential components of Christian
education. The Kentucky Supreme
Court, for example, held state teacher
certification requirements unconstitutional in its 1979 State v. Rudasill
decision. 589 S.W.2d 877 (Ky. 1 979).
For that court:
One other issue involved in
lawsuits between Christian
educators and the state is the right of
parents to direct the upbringing of
their children. One of the leading
court decisions that supports the
position of Christian educators is the
Supreme Court's '1925 Pierce v.
Society of Sisters decision. In it, the
Court explicitly recognized the (due
process) right of parents to direct the
upbringing of their children. 268 U.S.
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a foreign power may import into
the United States; or (c) procedures
to screen incoming materials to
determine if their circulation is
restricted by law within the United
States."
In its report, the I RR Section
quoted President Ronald Reagan:
"Expanding contacts across borders
and permitting a free exchange or
interchange of information and
ideas increase confidence; sealing
off one's people from the rest of the
world reduces it."
"A free flow of information," the
report said, "and ideas among
American citizens is crucial to the
health of our democratic society.
Through open and ro.bust debate in
the 'marketplace of ideas,' American citizens inform themselves of
policy choices which shape and affect their lives. The flow of information in and out of the United
States is an important part of this
exchange. Moreover," the report
submitted to the house said, "international obligations of the United
States commit us to faciliate the
flow of information."

510 (1 925). The Pierce Court held unconstitutional an Oregon statute
which required all children to attend
public schools. The Court ruled that
the State could not outlaw private
schooling and that
[t]he fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose, excludes any general power over
the state to standardize its
children by forcing them to accept instruction from pub I ic
teachers only. The child is not
the mere creature of the State;
those who nurture him and
direct his destiny have the right,
coupled with the high duty, to
recognize and prepare him for
additional obligations. 268 U.S.
at 535.
In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court similarly ruled that Amish parents have
a First Amendment religious I iberty
right to remove their teenage chii-

(P/ease turn to page 52)
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dren from public schools. 406 U.S.
205 (1972). According to the Court:
"[t]he history and culture of Western
civilization reflect a strong tradition
of parental concern for the nurture
and upbringing of their children. This
primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition." 406 U.S.
at 232. The Court further noted that
the parent's right to prepare his child
for additional obligations extended
to "the inculcation of moral standards, religious beliefs, and elements
of good citizenship." 406 U.S. at 233.
Finally, in the case of Free Exercise
challenges, the Court held that parental decisions must be respected
unless it appears that these decisions
"will jeopardize the health or safety
of the child or have a potential for
significant social burdens." 406 U.S.
at 234. As the Court stated in Prince
v. Massachusetts: "[i]t is cardinal
with us that the custody, care, and
nurture of the child reside first in the
parents, whose primary function and
freedom include preparation for obI igations the state can neither supply
nor hinder." 321 U.S.158, 166(1944).
These decisions, however, should

(Continued from page 35)

not be interpreted to give parents
carte blanche authority over their
children's educations. In fact, the
Prince court acknowledged:
No question is raised concerning
the power of the State reasonably to regulate all schools, to
inspect, supervise and examine
them, their teachers and pupils;
to require that all children of
proper age attend some school,
that teachers shall be of good
moral character and patriotic
disposition, that certain studies
plainly essential to good citizenship must be taught, and that
nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical to the public
welfare. 268 U.S. at 534.
Presently, the Supreme Court explicitly recognizes the constitutionality
of reasonable state regulations of
private schools which promote a
compelling state interest in education. In Board of Education v. Allen,
for example, the Court observed that:
[s]ince Pierce, a substantial body
of case law has confirmed the
power of the States to insist that
attendance at private schools,
if it is to satisfy state compulsory-attendance laws, be at in-
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stitutions which provide mmlmum hours of instruction,
employ teachers of specified
training, and cover prescribed
subjects of instruction. 392 U.S.
236, 245-247 (1968).
In other words, "if the State must satisfy its interest in secular education
through the instrument of private
schools, it has a proper interest in the
manner in which those schools perform their secular educational function." Allen at 247. Numerous other
Supreme Court decisions have recognized the rights of states to impose
reasonable regulations on its private
schools. But the Supreme Court has
yet to determine where the line separating reasonable from unreasonable state regulations should be
drawn.
[i]t cannot be said as an absolute
that a teacher in a nonpublic
school ... will be unable to instruct children to become intelligent citizens ... [T]he receipt
of 'a bachelor's degree from a
standard college or university'
is an indicator of the level of
achievement, but it is not a sine
qua non the absence of which
establishes that private and pa-
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rachial school teachers are unable to teach their students to
intelligently exercise the elective franchise. 589 S.W.2d at 884.
The Ohio Supreme Court and a Michigan trial court have similarly held
such certification requirements unconstitutional. State (of Ohio) v.
Whisner, 47 Ohio St. 2d 181 (1976),
State(of Michigan) v. Nobel, S-7-910114-A (Allegan Cty., Mich.) In the
Ohio case, the court noted:
In the face of the record before
us, and in light of the expert testimony, [l]t is difficult to imagine
a state interest of sufficient
magnitude to override the interest claiming protection under
the free exercise clause ... We
shall not, therefore, attempt to
conjure up such an interest in
order to sustain application of
the 'minimum standards' to
these appellants. 47 Ohio St. 2d
at217-218.
In stark contradiction to these decisions, the Nebraska Supreme Court
upheld a teacher certification requirement in State v. Faith Baptist
Church, 301 N.W. 2d 571 (Neb.1981 ).
301 N.W.2d 571 (Neb. 1981 ). That
court thought that:
it cannot be fairly disputed that
such a requirement is neither arbitrary nor unreasonable.
[A]dditionally, we believe it is
also a reliable indicator or the
probability of success in that
particular field. We believe that
it goes without saying that the
State has a compelling interest
in the quality and ability of those
who are to teach its young people.
The North Dakota Supreme Court, in
reaching the same conclusion, approached the teacher certification
issue in a different manner. For that
court:
courts are ill-equipped to act as
school boards and determine
the need for discrete aspects of
a compulsory school education
program. The Courtroom is
simply not the best arena for the
debate of issues of educational
policy and the measurement of
educational equality. Although
North Dakota's minimal requirement for state approval of a private or parochial school may be

imperfect, without the regulations the state would have no
reasonable assurance that its
recognized interest in providing
an education for its youth is
being protected. State v. Shaver,
294 N.W.2d 883, 899-980 (N.D.
1980).
A North Carolina trial court also upheld state teacher certification procedures as "[a necessary means] to
insure that the child receives [essential] skills." State v. Columbus Christian Academy, No. 78 CVS 1678 at 14
(Wake County Super. Ct.).
This variance among court decisions can be attributed to a number
of factors. The most significant is
that Supreme Court decisions on the
parent-child-state issue are sufficiently diverse to support lower
courts in their decisions to either
uphold or invalidate state regulatory
schemes. Consequently, judges were
able to find precedential support to
justify apparent value preferences.
Moreover, litigants in these lawsuits
fed the possibility of such judicial
bais by failing to adequately present
their cases before the courts.
Bangor Baptist and Sheridan Road
are especially important cases
because they represent the most extensive trials on the religious
freedom issue in the Christian school
context to have taken place. In the
past, Christian school lawsuits have
been characterized by poor lawyering on the part of some state prosecutors and Christian school attorneys. Consequently, previous
court decisions frequently did not
address legal issues in a defintive
matter because attorneys failed
either to introduce evidence to support their claims, or raise legal arguments which would support their
position. See T. Minnery, "Does
David Gibbs Practice Law as Well as
He Preaches Church-State Separation?," Christianity Today, November
12,1982 at 48.
The Bangor Baptist case is also significant because it is the first Christian school lawsuit to be resolved by
a federal district court. All previous
Christian school cases were initiated
in state courts. The Bangor Baptist
decision thus stands as a unique precedent. This is particularly important
because federal court opinions are
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An important issue
involved in lawsuits
between Christian
educators and the
state is the right
of parents to direct
the upbringing of
their children
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generally accorded more precedential value than out-of-state court decisions. What this means is that Christian school attorneys will emphasize
their legal victory in Maine in forthcoming lawsuits with other states.
It is important, however, to realize
the possible limitations of the Bangor
Baptist case. Judge Cyr's ruling was
based on statutory grounds, not constitutional grounds. Since Maine's
statutory scheme varies in significant
respects from regulatory schemes of
other states, the Bangor Baptist decision does not directly repudiate
the authority of state officials to promulgate teacher certification, curriculm, and many other types of
regulations. Instead, Judge Cyr
merely held that Maine education
officials were without statutory authority to shut down unaccredited
church schools.
Judge Cyr found controlling the
fact that no Maine law "prohibits private schools from operating merely
because they are unapproved or refuse to seek or accept approval."
The judge felt that "[i]f the legislature
had meant to ban the operation of unapproved private schools, 'it would
have said so in the clear and unmistakable language."' Rather, Cyr
noted that Maine's compulsory education law establishes an elaborate
plan for prosecuting individuals responsible for keeping students out
of school. Consequently, he concluded that if the state were to shut
down the schools, "the administrative safeguards of notice, hearing
and conciliation" of the truancy process would be eliminated.
The limited statutory nature of the
Bangor Baptist decision should not
severely diminish its value as a precedent in future Christian school lawsuits, however. Judge Cyr's decision
suggests that even if state officials
had statutory authority to shut down
unaccredited Christian schools,
"grave constitutional problems" and
"serious constitutional difficulties"
would be raised relating to religious
I iberty, rights of enterprise and prior
restraints on First Amendment liberties. In fact, in October 1982, Judge
Cyr refused on First Amendment
grounds to grant the state the right to
shut down Maine's unaccredited
Christian schools without a trial on

the merits. Apparently, Judge Cyr
based his recent decision on statutory grounds because of the Supreme
Court's admonition to, whenever
possible, avoid constitutional determinations.
The State of Maine did not appeal
the Bangor Baptist ruling.
Unlike the Bangor Baptist case,
the Sheridan Road court resolved the
constitutional issue presented to it.
That court upheld- on constitutional grounds-regulations quite similarto those utilized in Maine. Instead
of viewing this regu Ia tory scheme to
be of dubious constitutional validity,
the Michigan Court concluded: "that
any burden [that state procedures
place on the religious] beliefs [of
Christian educators] is not constitutionally significant." These educators
had alleged that state teacher certification and licensing requirements
unjustifiably burdened their right to
religious liberty. Additionally, Michigan's Christian educators contended
that state requirements infringed on
the due process rights of parents to
direct the upbringing of their
children.
The Michigan Court of Appeals did
not deny that the state interfered
with constitutional rights of Michigan's Christian educators. Yet, since
Christian educators did not object to
having their children taught by certified teachers who shared religious
beliefs similar to their own, the Sheridan Road court concluded that
"[t]here is no showing that compliance with the requirement would
render, the [religious] mission of
[these] schools impractical or impossible."
Combined with this ruling that only
a "minimal burden" was placed on
religious beliefs, the Michigan court
validated state officials' contentions
that their laws and regulations are a
necessary and unobtrusive means to
ensure that their youth receive an
adequate education. In so doing, the
court dismissed as irrelevant
evidence proffered by Christian
educators which indicated that their
children performed as well on nationally recognized achievement tests as
did their public school counterparts.
Significantly, the state court of appeals also sought to distinguish its
ruling from state court decisions in
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Kentucky (Rudasill) and Ohio (Whisner) which upheld the rights of Christian educators on constitutional
grounds; noting that in Kentucky a
constitutional provision unique to
that state was at issue and in Ohio
the state regulations were so intrusive
as to "make meaningless" the rights
of parents to direct their children's
rei igious upbringing.
The Michigan Supreme Court
refused to review this ruling.
The Sheridan Road and Bangor Baptist decision provide a mixed message
to both state legislators and Christian
educators. On the one hand, Bangor
Baptist suggests that state efforts to
extensively regulate schools might be
foreclosed by legal action. On the
other hand, Sheridan Road indicates
that state officials have great leeway
in their development of regulations
which govern the operation of churchaffiliated private schools.
At this juncture, it is impossible to
determine which of the two decisions
is more significant. Although the
Bangor Baptist case was decided by
a more influential court, the decision
did not directly address the case's religious liberty issue. The Sheridan
Road decision, however, is of limited
precedential value since it was not
affirmed by the Michigan Supreme
Court.
Both decisions, however, point to
the need for some definitive resolution of the Christian school issue.
Over the past five years, at least 16
state courts have issued decisions on
this matter. These decisions, as a
whole, are quite inconclusive as to
the rights and responsibilities of both
the state and Christian educators.
This varied body of court decisions
suggest that this issue will remain unresolved until the U.S. Supreme Court
addresses this matter.
hr
The ABA Commission on Legal Problems of the Elderly has published a
monograph describing the private
law practice of serving the elderly.
Copies of the publication, "Doing
Well by Doing Good: Providing
Legal Services to the Elderly in a
Paying Practice," are available free
from the Commission on Legal
Problems of the Elderly, ABA, 1800
M St. N.W., Washington, DC 20036.

